Security Context is the SE Linux label for a process, file, or other resource. Each process or object that a process may access has exactly one security context. It has four main parts separated by colons: User:Role:Domain/Type:Sensitivity Label. Note that the Sensitivity Label is a compile-time option that all distributions enable nowadays.
User in terms of SE Linux is also known as the Identity. The program semanage can be used to add new identities and to change the roles and sensitivities assigned to them. System users often end in “_u” (EG user_u, unconfined_u, and system_u) but this is just a convention used to distinguish system users from users that associate directly with Unix accounts – which are typically the same as the name of the account. So the user with Unix account john might have a SE Linux user/identity of john. Note that as the local sysadmin can change the user names with semanage you can’t make any strong assumptions about a naming convention. When a process creates a resource (such as a file on disk) then by default the resource will have the same user as the process.
Role for a process determines the set of domains that may be used for running a child process. Through semanage you can configure which roles may be entered by each user. The default policy has the roles user_r, staff_r, sysadm_r, and system_r. Adding new roles requires recompiling the policy which is something that most sysadmins don’t do. So you can expect that all role names end in “_r“.
Object Class refers to the object that is to be accessed, there are 82 object classes in the latest policy, many of which are related to things such as the X server. Some object classes are file, dir, chr_file, are blk_file. The reason for having an object class is so that access can be granted to one object with a given type label but not be granted to another object of a different object class.
Type is the primary label for the Domain/Type or Type-Enforcement model of access control, by tradition a type name ends in “_t“. There is no strong difference between a domain and a type, a domain is the type of a process. In the DT model there are a set of rules which specify what happens when a domain tries to access an object of a certain object class for a particular access (read, write, etc).
MLS stands for Multi Level Security, it’s a hierarchical system for restricting access to sensitive data. It’s core principle is that of no write-down and no read-up. In a MLS system you can only write data to a resource with an equal or higher sensitivity label.
MCS stands for Multi Category Security.
Sensitivity Level is for a hierarchical level of sensitivity in the MLS policy. In the default policy there are 16 levels from s0 to s15. The MCS policy uses some of the mechanisms of MLS but not the level, so in MCS the level is always set to s0. The policy can be recompiled to have different numbers of levels.
Category is a primitive for the MCS and MLS policies. The default policy has 1024 categories from c0 to c1023, the policy can be recompiled to have different numbers of categories.
Sensitivity Label is for implementing MLS and MCS access controls. It may be ranged, in which case it has a form “LOW-HIGH” where both LOW and HIGH are comprised of a Sensitivity Level and a set of categories separated by a colon – EG “s0:c1-s1:c1.c10” means the range from level s0 with category c1 to the level s1 with the set of categories from c1 to c10 inclusive. If it isn’t ranged then it just has a level and a set of categories separated by a colon. In a set of categories a dot is used to indicate a range of categories (all categories between the low one and the high one are included) while a comma indicates a discontinuity in the range. So “c1.c10,c13” means the set of all categories between c1 and c10 inclusive plus the category c13. The kernel will canonicalise category sets, so if it is passed “c1,c2,c3” then it will return “c1.c3“. These raw labels may be translated into a more human readable form by mcstransd.
Constraint is a rule that restricts access. SE Linux is based on the concept of deny by default and the domain-type model uses rules to allow certain actions. Constraints are used for special cases where access needs to be restricted outside of the domain-type model. MCS and MLS are implemented using constraints.
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